for the role of the basal ganglia in decision-making. functions (e.g. Alexander et al., 1986; Middleton and Strick, 1994) 
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(for a review see Middleton and Strick, 2000) . Cognitive impair- Jahanshahi, 2013; Dubois et al., 2007; Emre et al., 2010;  77 Kehagia et al., 2010; Litvan et al., 2012) and impact on impor-78 tant abilities, such as decision-making (Brand et al., 2004; Mimura 79 et al., 2006; Pagonabarraga et al., 2007 , 1988; Jahanshahi et al., 2010; Swainson et al., 2000) . More 98 specifically, dopaminergic medication successfully alleviates some 99 working memory, cognitive sequencing and task switching impair-100 ments in PD (MacDonald and Monchi, 2011) . At the same time this 101 medication has been linked to impairments in conditional asso-102 ciative learning, probabilistic reversal learning, and incremental 103 learning with feedback (e.g. Cools, 2001; Cools et al., 2003 Cools et al., , 2007 104 Gotham et al., 1988; Jahanshahi et al., 2010) . To account for this puz-105 zling set of findings, the 'dopamine overdose' hypothesis (Gotham 106 et al., 1988; Cools et al., 2003) proposes that while dopaminer-107 gic medication has beneficial effects in the areas of the brain most 108 affected in the early stages of the disease, such as the dorsal stri-109 atum, it causes overdosing in the parts less affected, such as the 110 ventral striatum. In addition to the variable effects of dopaminergic medication on 114 tests of cognitive functioning, another major source of variability in 115 PD patients' performance is the indices of performance themselves, 116 namely the tests. Studies of decision-making ability in PD are a case 117 in point (Osman, 2011) . For instance, some experiments using tasks 118 designed to mimic risky decision-making (e.g. Iowa Gambling Task 119 (IGT)) revealed impairments in decision-making in PD (e.g. Brand 120 et al., 2004; Kobayakawa et al., 2008; Mimura et al., 2006) . Stud-121 ies utilizing tasks designed to mimic everyday decision-making 122 (e.g. Dynamic decision-making tasks (DDM)), on the other hand, 123 observed no such deficits (e.g. Osman et al., 2008; Witt et al., 2006) . 124 Consequently, inconsistent results presented in the literature on 125 decision-making in PD may stem from methodological issues: given 126 that the tests of decision-making differ considerably, results from 127 various studies may not be comparable. Without careful evaluation, 128 this can lead to a distorted picture of the actual decision-making 129 impairments in PD. Our aim is to comprehensively review the pattern of findings 132 that emerge from studies investigating PD patients' performance 133 on different decision-making tasks. Our goal is to identify the exact 134 nature of the deficits and the influence of task characteristics and 135 medication status on decision-making performance in PD. The first 136 part of the review introduces the tasks that are commonly used to 137 study decision-making in PD, and discusses the specific experimen-138 tal manipulations that are associated with impairments, including 139 medication status. Next, the general findings of a meta-analysis of 140 38 studies investigating decision-making impairments in PD are 141 presented. The results of the meta-analysis are evaluated and dis-142 cussed in the concluding section of this article with a particular 143 focus on the implications of these findings for the role of the basal 144 ganglia in decision-making. 
Decision-making stages and tasks

146
Evidence has shown that decision-making relies on several 147 processing steps which are supported by different brain areas and 148 neurotransmitter systems (Delazer et al., 2009; Kable and Glimcher, 149 2009; Rangel et al., 2008 Tasks used to study decision-making can be divided into two cat-
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egories (see Fig. 1 (Meder et al., 2013; Osman, 2011; Trepel et al., 2005) . One 220 factor to bear in mind is that the distinction between tasks that 221 examine decision-making under risk and decision-making under 222 uncertainty is not a clear cut one. One reason for this is that tasks 223 that examine both risk and uncertainty also include a learning 224 component, in which participants attempt to infer the underlying 225 probabilities. This in turn implies that there are likely to be poten-226 tial differences in performance which is based on differences in 227 the learning processes employed by participants, rather than the 228 underlying structure of the risky situation they are trying to make 229 decision on. This is especially the case in task such as the Iowa Gam-230 bling Task where differences in performance can be attributed to 231 either differences in learning or differences in risk preference. In 232 many decision-making tasks that involve a learning component, it 233 is not always possible to unambiguously separate out the two. When we make decisions under risk, some estimation of an out-236 come can be calculated, such as betting on a certain number landing 237 face-up when throwing a dice. Take, for instance, the Game of Dice 238 Task (GDT). Here, participants are asked to place a bet on a num-239 ber that will come up on the dice, just before it is rolled. They can 240 choose between (A) single number (e.g. 4), (B) two numbers (2 or 241 4), and (C) three numbers (1, 2, 5). They receive outcome feed-242 back (i.e. the actual result of the dice roll), and information about 243 reward (how much they won or lost). The task is set up so that 244 the more likely the probability of winning (e.g. option C) the lower 245 the reward. When comparing performance of patients with PD on 246 medication with performance of healthy controls (HCs), the former 247 tended to choose the riskier options A and B more often than the lat-248 ter (e.g. Brand et al., 2004; Euteneuer et al., 2009 ). However, when 249 immediate feedback was removed (i.e. participants did not receive 250 any information about the actual outcome of the dice roll) risky 251 behaviour dropped (e.g. Labudda et al., 2010) .
252
An alternative to the GDT is the Cambridge Gambling Task (CGT). 253 Participants are presented with a row of 10 boxes which can be 254 either red or blue, and are asked to place a bet on whether a token 255 has been hidden under a red or a blue box. The proportion of red and 256 blue boxes changes from trial to trial. In this task participants are 257 aware of the risk associated with each option, and are expected to 258 adjust their betting behaviour to the number of red and blue boxes. 259 For example, when seven blue and three red boxes are presented, 260 participants are expected to indicate that the token is hidden under 261 a blue box. Following this choice, participants are invited to place 262 a bet (in a form of a percentage of their current task credit) on 263 whether or not they believe their decision will prove to be correct. 264 Cools et al. (2003) reported that compared to age matched healthy 265 controls (HCs) PD patients on medication exhibited abnormal bet-266 ting behaviour which was suggestive of impulsivity; they tended to 267 make bets quicker than PDs off medication and HCs. On the other 268 hand, Delazer et al. (2009) showed that in an adapted version of the 269 task (Probability-Associated Gambling Task) PD patients on medi-270 cation performed just as well as HCs. However, it has to be noted 271 that no measures of impulsivity were included in this particular 272 version of the CGT task. uncertainty in patients with PD is the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT).
280
In the IGT participants are presented with 100 or so trials, and on 281 each trial they are required to choose between four decks of cards.
282
Unbeknownst to the participants two of the decks are advanta- probabilistic and deterministic version of the PLTIT task revealed 364 exactly that. Moreover, the opposite was found for PD patients off 365 medication, with the results showing that they were reliably better 366 at avoiding negative stimuli at the lower end of the hierarchy.
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Along the same lines as the PLTIT, the Chaining task also requires 368 participants to learn the ordering of relevant information. In the 369 Chaining task participants learn through trial and error the correct 370 sequence of coloured doors to complete the task. In this computer-371 based environment participants have to guide a character through 372 4-6 different rooms to reach a goal (an outside world or a hidden 373 treasure). In each room they are presented with a set of three doors 374 of different colours. Participants need to learn which door is cor-375 rect in each room. When the correct door is chosen participants 376 move on to the next room, and in the final room participants reach 377 the outside world/hidden treasure. No monetary reward is usu-378 ally offered for completing the whole sequence correctly. Contrary 379 to the results of most of the studies described above, PD patients 380 performed just as well as HCs during this task when on dopami-381 nergic medication, i.e. they were able to learn a correct sequence of 382 doors as quickly as HCs and were as accurate as HCs (Shohamy 383 et al., 2005 ). However, when tested off medication, PD patients 384 were significantly worse than HCs (Nagy et al., 2007; Shohamy et al., 385 2005) .
386
Finally, what differentiates Dynamic Decision-making (DDM) 387 tasks from all the aforementioned tasks is that there is an under-388 lying causal structure between the cue (input) information and 389 the outcome (output), and participants make decisions by directly 390 manipulating the values of the inputs. A good example of a DDM 391 task is the Sugar Factory task, designed by Berry and Broadbent 392 (1984) . It is a computer-based environment in which participants 393 take on a role of a sugar factory manager. Participants usually 394 have about 40 trials to learn to reach and maintain a specific 395 output value (e.g. level of sugar production) by manipulating the 396 value of the cue (e.g. the number of workers employed) (Berry and 397 Broadbent, 1984) . The task is dynamic because the output value 398 changes directly as a result of the actions of the decision maker, but 399 can also change independently of their choices -according to the 400 type of probabilistic structure that is embedded in the task. On each 401 trial participants receive cumulative outcome feedback informing 402 them of the output value they have achieved over several trials. In 403 general PD patients on medication perform just as well as HCs on 404 this task based on their ability to reach and maintain the output 405 value to the target level (Osman et al., 2008; Rutledge et al., 2009; 406 Witt et al., 2006) . 407 2.1.3. Summary of differences in decision-making tasks 408 All of the tasks described above involve an element of learn-409 ing either through outcome feedback or through information about 410 rewards. Differences in the learning processes employed to infer 411 the underlying probabilities within a task might have direct influ-412 ence on the results of different studies. Furthermore, none of 413 the tasks involve the same underlying cue-outcome relation-414 ship, which in itself dictates the probabilities of certain outcomes 415 occurring. In addition, some tasks examine decision-making under 416 uncertainty, whereas others look at decision-making under risk. 417 All this might impact the way people make decisions on these 418 tasks. In fact, human and animal studies suggest that the probabil-419 ities of different outcomes occurring have direct consequences for 420 shaping the preferences between options (e.g. Bechara et al., 1997; 421 Brand et al., 2006; Delazer et al., 2009; Kahneman and Tversky, 422 1979) . Therefore, the decision-making process might look differ-423 ently when the probabilities of different outcomes occurring are 424 known (decision-making under risk) as compared to when they 425 have to be estimated by the decision maker (decision-making under 426 uncertainty). This needs to be taken into account when investigat-427 ing decision-making in PD on different types of tasks. Moreover, 428
Please cite this article in press as: Ryterska xxx (2013) Seger and Cincotta, 2005) , which in turn could result in 501 impaired feedback processing in PD patients in whom this struc-502 ture is affected. This is supported by several studies indicating that 503 impaired performance of PD patients might result from impaired 504 processing of trial-by-trial outcome feedback. PD patients have 505 been shown to be able to make advantageous decisions in a 506 gambling scenario when all the necessary information was explic-507 itly given, and no outcome feedback was provided (Minati et al., 508 2011). Furthermore, Shohamy et al. (2004b) compared perfor-509 mance on the WPT with outcome feedback and without (e.g. a 510 paired associate (PA) version in which PD patients were pre-511 sented with cues and outcomes simultaneously). PD patients in 512 the no-feedback condition outperformed those in the feedback 513 condition. Shohamy et al. (2008) 
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What adds to the confusion is that tasks used to examine 527 decision-making in PD have utilized two different types of feed-528 back. In some tasks (e.g. WPT) the feedback is discrete, which means 529 that it only informs people about the success of their actions on a 530 given trial. Such feedback provides very little information about 531 the rule underlying cue-outcome relationship (i.e. task structure -532 underlying association between cues, outcome probabilities, and 533 rewards), unless it is tracked over time, which puts a stress on 534 working memory. For example, if a given cue is associated with 535 a given outcome 80% of the time, then feedback that informs par-536 ticipants that on this particular trial the cue was followed by this 537 particular outcome does not help in any way to discover the rule 538 governing the cue outcome relationship in this task, unless peo-539 ple have a significant degree of exposure to the task. In tasks that 540 use cumulative feedback (e.g. DDM), on the other hand, people are 541 provided with information about their performance relative to a 542 target across several trials. This kind of feedback makes it much 543 easier for participants to discover the rule guiding the cue outcome 544 relationship, because they can track their performance more eas-545 ily without burdening their working memory. Using the example 546 described above, if a given cue is associated with a given outcome 547 80% of the time, then feedback that informs participants that on 548 past five trials this particular cue was followed by this particular 549 outcome on four occasions, makes it easier for participants to fig-550 ure out what the cue-outcome relationship actually is. In general 551 studies utilizing discrete feedback tend to find PD patients to be 552 impaired (e.g. Knowlton et al., 1996; Perretta et al., 2005; Sage et al., 553 2003) , whereas studies utilizing cumulative feedback usually find 554 decision making in PD to be intact (e.g. Osman et al., 2008 , Witt 555 et al., 2002 . Consequently, it seems that when informational con-556 tent of feedback is rich, frequent, or in some cases not provided 557 at all, these situations seems to assist PD patients in learning and 558 decision-making (Shohamy et al., 2004b; Witt et al., 2006 
.
583
A decrease in dopamine levels in PD is associated with degen- employing the tasks reviewed in this article.
619
The specific manipulations that were examined were the 620 decision-making paradigm (decision-making under risk vs. uncer-621 tainty), environment (probabilistic vs. deterministic), feedback 622 structure of the task (discrete vs. other), and medication status (on 623 vs. off dopaminergic medication). Also, to investigate the proposal 624 that PD patient's impaired performance is a result of slower rates 625 of learning (i.e. that people with PD are capable of learning about 626 the underlying cue-outcome associations, but require more trials 627 to achieve it) the number of trials in each test was entered into the 628 analysis as well. The electronic search of databases in January 2013 629 using key words 'Parkinson's disease' and 'decision-making' iden-630 tified 363 results. Following the examination of titles and abstracts 631 we excluded all reviews and animal studies. Given that we were 632 only interested in tasks in which successful performance would 633 require intact processing of all stages of the decision-making pro-634 cess described in Section 2, we excluded tasks not employing the 635 basic set-up described above. We also excluded studies which 636 examined PD patients suffering from impulse control disorders (e.g. 637 pathological gambling), unless these studies included PD patients 638 without these disorders and their healthy peers as control groups. 639 Consequently, 32 papers were selected, and further 20 studies were 640 identified based on reference lists. From the list of 52 studies, 641 those which did not have age-matched healthy participants as a 642 control group were eliminated from the analysis (e.g. Rossi et al., 643 2010) . Two studies examining performance of PD patients who had 644 Deep Brain Stimulation surgery were also excluded (Halbig et al., 645 2004; Wilkinson et al., 2011) . This resulted in 38 studies which 646 were included in the final analysis. Each study was then classified 647 according to the four manipulations described above. Binary val-648 ues were assigned to each of the relevant categories (e.g. 'patients 649 interviewed off medication' assigned numerical value of 1, 'patients 650 interviewed on medication' assigned numerical value of 2). Each 651 study was described using the appropriate numerical values for 652 each category. For each study the outcome on performance was 653 recorded (i.e. 1, patients with PD performed as well as HCs; 2, 654 showed impairments). The next step of the analysis was to conduct 655 a logistic regression to find the task characteristics that could influ-656 ence the results of studies examining decision-making processes in 657 PD patients. 
Results
659
38 studies from the past 18 years were analyzed (earliest: 1994; 660 most recent: 2012) -60 separate experiments of decision-making 661 in PD (studies with PD patients ON and OFF med, or with different 662 types of feedback were counted as separate instances of PD patients 663 performing the task -these were labelled as separate tests). PD 664 patients were found to be impaired relative to HCs on 39 exper-665 iments (65% of all experiments). Logistic regression analysis was 666 performed to assess the impact of the decision-making paradigm, 667 environment (i.e. the rule governing the cue-outcome relation-668 ship), feedback, and medication status on the likelihood that PD 669 patients would be impaired on decision-making tasks. The crite-670 rion variable was whether or not PD patients were impaired on the 671 decision-making task compared to healthy age-matched controls. 672 Only the significant results of this analysis are reported. The full 673 model containing all predictors was statistically significant, х 2 (5, 674 N = 60) = 22.75, p < .001, indicating that the model was able to dis-675 tinguish between impaired and unimpaired PD patients. The model 676 as a whole explained between 33.4% (Cox and Snell R square) and 677 45.5% (Nagelkerke R squared) of the variance in PD patients' perfor-678 mance on the decision-making tasks, and correctly classified 82.1% 679 of cases.
680
As shown in Table 1 impaired incremental learning in HCs, similar to that reported in PD 732 patients, was observed (e.g. Knowlton et al., 1996; Shohamy et al., 733 2004b; Smith and McDowall, 2006 The results of the current meta-analysis also suggest that PD 755 patients tend to perform better on decision-making tasks when 756 they are examined off rather than on their usual medication. How-757 ever, this is not true for all decision-making tasks. This suggests that 758 dopaminergic medication also does not affect the global decision-759 making ability, but rather some components of this process.
760
The fact that PD patients on medication tend to perform worse 761 on some decision-making tasks, when considered in the con-762 text of the dopamine "overdosing" hypothesis (Cools et al., 2003; 763 Gotham et al., 1988) , suggests that some components of the 764 decision-making process in PD might depend on parts of the brain 765 less affected at the early stages of the disease, which become 766 'overdosed' with dopamine after administration of dopaminergic 767 medication. In PD neurodegeneration the striatum progresses in a 768 well-defined manner, with the dorsal striatum affected earlier in 769 the disease than the ventral striatum. Given this, processes that 770 involve the ventral striatum to a greater extent, such as stimulus-771 reward learning (e.g. MacDonald et al., 2013) , are adversely affected 772 by dopaminergic medication in patients with PD. This in turn might 773 explain why PD patients on medication are found to be impaired 774 on some decision-making tasks, for the reason that these tasks 775 may rely to a great extent on associative stimulus-reward learn-776 ing processes. It can be hypothesized, therefore, that dopaminergic 777 medication does not impair decision-making per se, instead, PD 778 impairs certain components of the decision-making process, such 779 as outcome evaluation, which in turn relies heavily on reward 780 processing mediated by the ventral striatum. This, in turn, results in 781 poor performance of PD patients on medication on decision-making 782 tasks providing participants with certain types of feedback. and category learning (Seger, 2008; Shohamy et al., 2008) . Cru- cumulative feedback could be advantageous for decision-makers.
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In addition, the results of this meta-analysis suggest that the 825 other key factor that greatly impairs decision-making in PD is dopa-826 minergic medication, which again seems to impair a specific stage 827 rather than a global decision-making process. Considering that the when performance dips decision makers should find it easier to 847 adapt their strategies to improve their performance. So, there is less 848 of a burden on processes concerning intrinsic rewards. However, 849 when the only information feedback provides in a decision mak-850 ing tasks is whether you were 'good' (coherent with participants' 851 predictions, therefore rewarding) or 'bad' (inconsistent with par-852 ticipants' predictions, therefore not rewarding), and moreover, is 853 only tangentially connected to the cue-outcome associations, then 854 being able to correctly process intrinsic rewards might be much 855 more important for the learning process. This would mean that 856 overdosing of dopaminergic medication would have the biggest 857 impact on performance when feedback provided in the task was 858 not informative of the underlying structure of the task, hence 859 the successful incorporation of the information provided by feed-860 back depended on correct reward processing. We would therefore 861 predict that the more remote the feedback is to the underlying 862 structure of the task, the greater the impairments in PD on medi-863 cation, and the greater the effect of overdosing. The current review set out to determine the scope of decision-866 making impairments in people with Parkinson's disease. This was 867 achieved by investigating the pattern of findings in decision-868 making tasks associated with manipulations of task environment 869 (deterministic vs. probabilistic), paradigm (risk vs. uncertainty), 870 feedback (discrete, continuous), number of trials, and medication 871 status of patients. The results suggest that discreet feedback and 872 dopaminergic medication generate the most significant impair-873 ments to decision-making behaviour in PD. The latter adds further 874 support to the dopamine overdosing hypothesis. At the same time 875 we found no evidence that factors such as task environment (proba-876 bilistic vs. deterministic) or task paradigm (decision-making under 877 risk or under uncertainty) influence decision-making in PD. The 878 implications of these findings are that Parkinson's disease does not 879 lead to a global impairment in decision-making ability, as some 880 studies would propose, but rather impairs processing in the final 881 stage of the decision-making process, namely the evaluation of the 882 outcome. We speculate that this is associated with difficulties in 883 processing feedback which does not contain sufficient information 884 about the task structure. This current finding adds to our under-885 standing of the role of the basal-ganglia in the decision-making 886 process, pointing to their importance for the reward processing 887 evaluative component of decision-making. cognitive and decision sciences say about or learn from economic crises? Trends
